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This paper analyses the sustainability of Portuguese public finances, making use of a 
long dataset with more than a full century of observations. The use of such a long 
dataset is appropriate because both unit root and cointegration tests require a long 
period of data. The sustainability testing procedure is based on unit root and 
cointegration tests. We find considerable evidence in favour of sustainability for the 
1903-2003 period. The overall conclusion of sustainability for the 1903-2003 period is 
not maintained for the more recent 1975-2003 period, which is characterised by the 
largest GDP deficit ratios of our sample. This latter period appears to signal a shift to 
an unsustainable path in Portuguese fiscal policy. Hence, our results suggest that 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Fiscal sustainability is a necessary pre-condition for fiscal policy to be effective at smoothing 
output fluctuations. In particular, a sustainable fiscal policy is needed to create the room for 
manoeuvre and enable the automatic fiscal stabilisers to operate. If fiscal policy is not on a 
sustainable path, it is not possible to use it as a counter-cyclical tool. Repeated fiscal profligacy 
resulting into a substantial accumulation of public debt, ultimately leads to the need to reverse 
such expansionary policy so as to avoid sustainability problems (regardless of the point in the 
business cycle), ruling out the ability of the budget to stabilise the economy. Consequently, it is 
desirable that fiscal policy acts symmetrically over the business cycle in order to avoid excessive 
debt accumulation.  
 
Given this background, it is extremely important to determine whether or not a country has 
a sustainable fiscal policy. This paper analyses the case of Portugal in a long-run perspective. We 
will make an empirical application using a long time-span, running from as early as 1852 until 
2003. Most of the studies already published regarding Portugal have just used the last thirty or 
forty years of fiscal data. Bravo and Silvestre (2002) used a similar approach for a sample 
running from 1960 to 2000 and concluded that Portuguese fiscal policy has not been sustainable. 
Afonso (2000), using data from 1970 to 1996, also concluded in favour of non-sustainability. 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II surveys the theoretical literature on the 
sustainability tests. Section III analysis the data and provides some historical background to 
Portuguese fiscal developments. Section V analyses the 1890-93 external debt crisis in detail, 
since this can be viewed as direct evidence against the sustainability of Portuguese public 
finances in the 19th century. Section IV tests for sustainability over the 1903-2003 period, i.e. 
excluding the pre-debt rescheduling (1902) data. We also separate the recent 1975-2003 
subperiod, characterized by the largest deficit ratios of our sample. Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Theoretical analysis 
 
The sustainability of public finances is a central issue in recent economic policy debate. 
Economic intuition indicates that a sustainable policy must ultimately avoid government 
bankruptcy. However, as Balassone and Franco (2000) rightly put it, despite such a clear 
economic intuition there are serious difficulties in both the analytical and operational definition 
of sustainability. There is no consensus in economic theory regarding the conditions for 
sustainability. Another problem with analysing sustainability is that it is based on a partial 
equilibrium framework, which disregards the interactions between the budget and the 
economy. In practice additional difficulties arise with the statistical definitions of the variables to 
be used in the assessment of sustainability, namely, the use of gross or net debt and the 
definition of the deficit.  
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In the literature we can find two groups of sustainability studies: a) those that assess 
whether past policies have been sustainable; and b) those that assess the sustainability of future 
budget balances. In this study we will focus on the first class of studies, since the long-term 
projections needed for the forward-looking application tend to be subject to wide margins of 
error. 
 
The sustainability analysis tries to determine whether there are any limits to the 
accumulation of public debt. It basically tries to answer the question of whether a government is 
able to present a perpetual deficit, rolling over its debt forever, or if it is subject to an 
intertemporal budget constraint (see Hamilton and Flavin (1986)). If governments, like 
individuals, are subject to such a constraint, then it is unfeasible to run a permanent primary 
deficit (i.e., exclusive of interest payments). However, as long as debt does not explode at a rate 
faster than the growth of the economy, it is possible, under certain circumstances, to run a 
permanent budget deficit (inclusive of interest payments). 
 
Due to the absence of consensus regarding the effects of the budget variables on the 
economy, the sustainability analysis adopts a partial equilibrium framework, assuming that 
both the interest rate and the economy’s growth rate are exogenous to fiscal policy. Hence, it 
does not take into account the possible impact of the accumulation of public debt on growth and 
on interest rates. It implicitly assumes Ricardian neutrality of the debt, and a small open 
economy, as is the case of Portugal. The analysis departs from the government budget 
constraint, explaining the dynamics of the public debt as a function of fiscal policy (revenues, 
primary expenditure and interest payments on public debt). This partial equilibrium framework 
was first used by Domar (1944). 
 
The empirical analysis of the sustainability issue has favoured two sets of tests. The first set 
studies the univariate statistical properties of government debt and is due to the seminal 
contribution of Hamilton and Flavin (1986). The second set of tests examines the cointegration 
properties of government revenues and expenditure. The most important contributions to the 
latter approach are those of Trehan and Walsh (1988), Trehan and Walsh (1991), and Quintos 
(1995). This second approach departs directly from the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC), 
and examines the sustainability of the budget process in a cointegration framework. When the 
government is subject to the IBC the current value of public debt must be equal to the 
discounted sum of expected future surpluses. If this condition is violated, it indicates that fiscal 
policy is not sustainable, because the debt would explode at a rate greater than the rate of 
growth of the economy to become an infinite multiple of GDP.  
 
The analysis departs directly from the intertemporal budget constraint. Abstracting from 
monetary financing of the deficit, this constraint could be written as follows: 
 
  tt t t 1 BS( 1 i ) B − = ++  (1) 
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where Bt is the end of period stock of government debt, St is the government’s primary deficit, 
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where Pt is the price level, and πt the inflation rate. Alternatively, the variables could be 
expressed as ratios to GDP: 3 
 
 
tt t t 1
tt t t 1
BS( 1 i ) B








Being Yt the GDP in period t and γt = Yt/Yt-1 – 1 the nominal growth rate of GDP. Substituting 
the ratios above by the small caps present in the numerator, and defining rt as [(1+it)/(1+πt)-1] for 
equation (2) or as [(1+it)/(1+gt)-1] for GDP-ratios in (3), we can write these two equations more 
compactly as: 
 
  tt t t 1 bs( 1 r ) b − = ++  (4) 
 
Rewriting and expanding the primary deficit term (st) yields: 
 
  tt 1t t t t 1 b bg t r b − − − =− +  (5) 
 
Where gt is real (or GDP-ratio) primary government expenditure, tt is real (or GDP-ratio) 
government revenues, and rt is the appropriate interest on the debt. By further assuming that the 









ttt t 1 gg( rr ) b − =+−  (7) 
 
i.e., g’t is real government primary expenditure plus interest payments, with interest rates taken 
around the r mean. 
 
Since equation (6) holds for every period, solving it by recursive forward substitution yields 
















++ ∑  (8) 
                                                      
3 According to Hakkio and Rush (1991) the use of ratios is more appropriate for a growing economy.   5
 
Defining Et (.) as an expectation conditional on information at time t, the intertemporal 










 =  + 
 (9) 
 
According to this transversality condition, the IBC implies that the current value of the 
outstanding public debt is equal to the present value of the expected future (primary) surpluses. 
Thus, this condition constrains the public debt to growth no faster than the real interest rate.4 
From this condition it is possible to derive various tests based on the concept of cointegration. 
One possibility is to define ggt as the total government expenditure inclusive of interest 
payments (evaluated at the adequate interest rate): 
 
  tt t t 1 gg g r b − = +  (10) 
 
The transversality condition set in (9) is satisfied if debt (bt) is integrated of order one, then by 
equation (5) the latter implies cointegration between ggt and tt, with the co-integrating vector 
[1 -1]. According to Hakkio and Rush (1991), a possible testing procedure involves two steps: 
a)  The order of integration of total expenditure and total revenues is analysed, using unit 
root tests. If both variables are I(1) is possible to go on to the second step. 
b)  Using adequate tests, the second step analyses whether the variables are cointegrated, 
and whether the cointegrating vector is [1 -1]. 
 
It is also possible to find a sufficient condition for sustainability by analysing the order of 
integration of the first difference of the debt, that is (1-L)bt.  As Trehan and Walsh (1991) show, if 
that first difference is stationary, than the debt is found to be sustainable. This test could be done 
by using an ADF to test for the presence of a unit root. As the first difference of the debt is 
mostly explained by the deficit, this test is conceptually equivalent to testing for the stationarity 
of the overall budget deficit.5   
 
Tests based on a constant expected real interest rate 
Trehan and Walsh (1991) show that when the conditional expectation of the real interest rate is 
constant, i.e. E(rt+i | It-1) = r for all i ≥  0, and (1-λL)St a quasi difference of the net-of-interest deficit 
is stationary with 0 ≤  λ ≤ R = 1+r, then the IBC holds if and only if the debt and the primary deficit 
are cointegrated. Hence, under these conditions sustainability may be tested by a cointegration 
                                                      
4 If we were using ratios to GDP, and the economy is dynamically efficient, meaning that the real interest 
rate (r) is greater than the real growth rate of the economy (n), the debt should grow at a rate less than 
[(1+n)/(1+r)]. 
5 If actual data is being used in empirical tests, the conclusions of the two tests might differ owing to the 
deficit-debt adjustments. Some of such adjustments are due to exchange rate fluctuations which affect the 
whole stock of foreign debt, but are not reflected in the deficit. In recent years, privatisation revenues have 
also had a unilateral positive impact on the debt series for some European countries.    6
test between st and bt. If the IBC holds then bt and st are co-integrated with a co-integrating 
vector [1 -r]. The intuition behind this result is simple: if fiscal policy is sustainable, an increase 
in public debt, which implies increased interest payments, must necessarily be matched by a 
decrease in the primary deficit.  
 
When λ=1, i.e. when the primary deficit is I(1), the test reduces to a test for the stationarity of 
the deficit inclusive of interest, as developed by Trehan and Walsh (1988).6 This is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for sustainability. An equivalent test is a test for a unit root in the first 
difference of the debt.  
 
Tests based on a variable expected real interest rate 
When the assumption of a constant expected rate does not provide a good characterization 
of the data generating process, the IBC no longer implies cointegration between the stock of debt 
and the net-of-interest (primary) deficit.7 These two variables can even be of different orders of 
integration. However, the test based on the stationarity of the first difference of the debt (1-L)bt, 
or on the stationarity of the inclusive-of-interest deficit is still valid. The stationarity of the overall 
deficit is a sufficient condition for sustainability, as long as the expected real rate of interest is 
positive. 
 
The stationarity of st + rt.bt-1 ensures that the outstanding stock of debt grows, at most, 
according to a linear trend. If we assume that the real interest rate is stationary and that both the 
revenues and the inclusive-of-interest expenditure are random walks, that is I(1), we reach the 
Hakkio and Rush (1991) sustainability test. The authors show that the intertemporal budget 
constraint requires that the inclusive-of-interest expenditure is cointegrated with revenues.  
 
Other sustainability tests have been suggested in the literature, such as Quintos (1995) and 
Bohn (1998). See Chalk and Hemming (2000) for a more exhaustive survey. 
 
III.  The data 
As mentioned before, we will use an extended dataset of historical annual data for the 
Portuguese economy since 1851. Since our time period covers almost a century and a half, a 
graphical analysis of the data is very interesting. This analysis will enable us to put the recent 
fiscal developments into a historical perspective. We will graph the fiscal variables (total 
government receipts, government primary expenditure, government interest payments, the 
budget balance and the primary balance) and data on the government debt. As the economy has 
been growing over time, we will express the data as a percentage of GDP. Another possibility 
would be to use real values or real per capita values. However, with very long data, the percent 
                                                      
6 In empirical tests, Trehan and Walsh (1991) use the deficit inclusive of interest defined as st+ rtbt-1 instead 
of st+ rbt-1. As the authors say in their footnote 7, that use does not invalidate the test because st+ rtbt-1 only 
differs from st+ rbt-1 by (rt -r)bt-1. Under their assumptions (rt -r) is a white noise process, which makes its 
product with bt-1 stationary. 
7 In their derivation Trehan and Walsh (1991) assumed a strictly positive expected real interest rate.   7
of GDP measures are more relevant, since what counts is the capacity of the economyʹs output to 
bear the debt burden. When examining the data, the real values measures give the impression of 
a large increase in the burden of debt in the more recent period, while the percent of GDP 
measures do not show this at all. Moreover as Bohn (1991: 344) points out, the use of GDP shares 
also mitigates the heteroskedasticity problems typical of unscaled long-run series.  
 
The main source of data is Valério (2001), complemented with other sources as explained in 
detail the statistical appendix. In order to have a coherent dataset, the budget variables refer 
only to central government and are expressed on a public accounting basis rather than a national 
accounting basis.8 Only par values are available for government debt. This is not a problem 
because the market value of the debt is not the relevant measure for the government. The 
government only has to pay the market value of the debt if it buys back the debt before it falls 
due. However, in a long-run dataset the differences between market and par values should be 
only temporary. 
 














Note: * The total revenues are adjusted to exclude the effects of the extraordinary one-off 
measures taken by the government in 2000, 2002 and 2003. 
 
 
In Portugal, the second half of the 19th century was characterised by the small expression of 
the public sector in the economy (see Figure III-1) and by successive budget deficits (see Figure 
                                                      
8 The source of the data is the annual report on budget execution “Conta Geral do Estado” (CGE). As 
explained in detail in the statistical appendix, a consistent national accounting estimate is only available 
from 1947 onwards. The reference value for the deficit set in the Treaty on European Union of 3% of GDP 
is expressed on a national accounting basis (ESA95). Comparing the overlapping period we can say that 
the fiscal data based on CGE that we use is more demanding for fiscal balance since it excludes some sub-
sectors of the public administration that show surpluses. Moreover, as public accounting mostly follows a 
cash basis for registering revenues and expenditure, it is theoretically more compatible with the debt 
series, which is also in a public accounting basis.   8
III-2).9 These deficits were in part the result of public investments in railway and road 
construction to be financed by debt, in the belief that such public investments would generate 
sufficient economic growth to repay the debt. However, economic growth did not accelerate. 
Those budget imbalances combined with sluggish economic growth thus resulted in a large debt 
accumulation, particularly an important external debt accumulation (see Figure III-4).10 In 1891 
the total public debt exceeded 70% of GDP, which was more than 10 times the amount of annual 
public revenues. As a result, the interest payments on the debt consumed more than half of the 
total effective revenues (see Figure III-5). This large debt burden, coupled with the small 
expression of public revenues in total GDP largely limited the impact of the public sector on the 
economy and was responsible for the external debt crisis of 1890-1893. The crisis was solved by 
rescheduling the external debt and by debt relief of 38% of the capital due in 1902. Below, we 
will examine this crisis in more detail. 
 
In the follow-up to the debt crisis the government was unable to obtain new external loans, 
and so it was forced to rely instead on the internal capital market and on loans from the Bank of 
Portugal to finance the deficit. Since funds available from these sources were limited, the 
government had no choice but to improve the soundness of public finances. As a result, the 
budget was even in surplus in 1894, 1896, and again in 1901. 
 
In the 20th century, in October 1910 to be precise, the Constitutional Monarchy came to an 
end and Portugal became a Republic. The public finances continued to improve gradually until 
the start of World War I (WWI), in which Portugal participated. The increase in military 
expenditure and the decline in revenues caused a large fiscal imbalance in this period. Apart 
from an external loan by the English government, the external capital markets remained closed 
to the Portuguese government. This meant that the government had to resort to monetary 
financing by the Bank of Portugal, which led to high inflation. Since most taxes were fixed in 
monetary terms, the tax revenues were partly eroded by inflation.11 The good news was that the 
s ame  hi gh inf lati on,  a nd  the  s u spe ns ion of  int e re s t  payment s  t o e ne my cou ntr ie s , he l pe d to 
reduce the real value of the debt. 
 
The military coup of 28 May 1926, and a few years later the establishment of the “Estado 
Novo” (literally New State), a corporatist dictatorial regime lead by Oliveira Salazar, 
                                                      
9 Our data starts in the period known as Regeneração (Regeneration) spanning 1851-1868. Prior to this, in 
1820, a liberal revolution put an end to the absolutist regime and started the Constitutional Monarchy 
with the proclamation of the Constitution of 1822. In the same year Brazil, the most important Portuguese 
colony, became independent. The move to a constitutional monarchy was not without its problems. There 
were conflicts between absolutists and liberals that culminated in the civil war of 1828-1834, won by the 
liberals. 
10 An important part of the debt accumulation is this period is explained by the practice of below par 
issuance of new debt (see section V, for further details). Part of this external financing went to public 
investment in infrastructures such as the railways. However, Mata (1993: 273) estimates this to be only 
38% of the total, and it had no apparent impact on sustained economic growth.  
11 The period of high inflation ended abruptly with the monetary stabilisation programme of Álvaro 
Castro in 1924.   9
dramatically changed the way fiscal policy was conducted. In the 45 years that followed, the 
dictatorial regime strictly observed the principle of fiscal balance.12 The public accounts 
therefore improved considerably, despite the relentless increase of the weight of the public 
sector on the economy. This made a sharp reduction in the stock of public debt possible (Figure 
III-4). The cancellation of the war debt to the UK in 1933 and the conversion of 2/3 of the 
remaining external debt into internal debt, meant that the external debt was virtually eliminated 
in 1940. After the Second World War, during which Portugal stayed neutral, strong economic 
growth and the accumulation of fiscal surpluses enabled the total debt ratio to reach a minimum 
of 15% of GDP in 1957. 
 
The year of 1974 marked the return of the budget to a substantial deficit position. In April of that 
year a revolution led by the army brought an end to the “Estado Novo” regime. The 
predominantly socialist ideology during the first years of the democratic regime that followed 
the April 25 revolution oversaw a dramatic increase in public intervention in the economy. 
Heavy industry and banking were nationalized, along with agriculture in the southern part of 
the country. Those actions plus the 1973 oil crisis led to substantial macroeconomic instability 
a n d  t o  s u c c e s s i v e  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s  c r i s e s .  Public expenditure on education, health care, 
pensions, transfers and subsidies increased massively, as did the budget deficit. As a result, the 
debt also rose, from 15% in 1973 to a maximum of 64% of GDP in 1996 (63% in 2003). 
Nevertheless, the increase in the total debt ratio was not as strong as might have been expected, 
considering the large budget deficits of this period. This somewhat milder debt increase was 
due to double-digit inflation until 1992, and to important privatisation revenues from 1989 
onwards. The entry into the European Community in 1986, and the run-up to the third phase of 
EMU led to increased fiscal discipline in the late 1990s. In 2001, however, Portugal was the first 
euro-area member to be subject to the Excessive Deficit Procedure for breaking the 3% ceiling for 
the deficit defined in the Treaty on European Union, and in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
 
                                                      
12 The budget surpluses of this dictatorship period are best viewed on a national accounting basis for the 
overall government. The data shown here just covers central government accounts, disregarding the other 
levels of government and public institutes that were generally in surplus.    10














Note: * excluding the effects of the extraordinary measures taken in 2000, 2002 and 2003. Taking into 
account such extraordinary revenues the deficit would be 2.2% in 2000, 4.5% in 2002 and 3.8% in 2003 
(instead of the graphed 2.5%, 5.9% and 5.2%, respectively). Such excluded revenues amounted to 399 
million EUR in 2000 (UMTS revenues); 1830 millions in 2002 (CREL revenues, sale of the fixed 
telecommunication network to Portugal Telecom and an extraordinary regularisation of taxpayers 
debts); and 1962 millions EUR in 2003 (mainly resulting from the sale/securitisation of government 
credits to Citigroup, and the integration of the pension fund of the Portuguese post office, CTT, into 
the public servants’ pension system, CGA). The deficit data is on a public accounting basis. In the 
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Note: From 1999 on there are no data on the subdivision of total debt into external and internal debt. 
The classification changes to debt issued in Euro versus issued in other currencies. 
 
 











Table 1- Summary statistics– averages -ratios to GDP (%) 















1852-2003  2.0% 0.0% 4.8%  45.4% 31.2% 7.9%  2.6%  5.2% 
1852-1890  1.1%  0.8%  4.0% 50.8%  33.4% 3.0% 1.8% 1.2% 
1903-2003  2.5%  -0.5%  5.3% 40.8% 6.7% 10.7% 3.0% 7.5% 
1975-2003 5.9% -1.6% 10.1%  50.9%  42.2%  15.4%  3.3% 11.7% 
1993-2003  4.0%  -0.3%  6.7% 61.0%  2.1% 6.7% 2.4% 4.2% 
Notes: The actual deficit measure excludes the revenues from one-off measures. The implicit interest rate on 
the debt is calculated as interest outlays in period t over the stock of debt in period t-1.   12
 
Table 1 summarizes the description of the data. Average deficit ratios are not high, except in 
the post-revolution period (1975-2003). We also distinguish the post-Maastricht period (1993-
2003). Comparing this with the longer post-revolution period (1975-2003) we can see an 
important improvement in the debt accumulation, but only modest progress in reducing the 
deficit. Focusing on the evolution of the debt increase, we can see that the overall accumulation 
of public debt is dominated by the accumulation of debt in the late 19 th century, due to the 
practice of below par issuance of new debt. Focusing on the post-debt rescheduling of the 1902 
period, the increase in the debt ratio is just 6.7% of GDP. However, as the graphical analysis 
shows there are important intra-period changes. Another interesting conclusion that can be 
drawn from the summary table is that for the 1903-2003 period the nominal growth of the 
economy has exceeded the average implicit interest rate on the debt. This means that growth 
has helped to diminish the debt ratio.  
 
 
IV.  Empirical evidence for the Portuguese economy 
Since the 1892 partial debt default may be interpreted as direct evidence of a non-sustainable 
fiscal policy in the 19th century, we decided to exclude the (1902) pre-debt-rescheduling period. 
Hence, we will base our conclusions on the 1903-2003 period.13 This is still a long period 
covering a full century of data, and some of the more important fiscal developments we have 
analysed. The use of such a long period of data is appropriate for both the unit root and 
cointegration tests on which we will base our conclusions. As already mentioned, following 
Hakkio and Rush (1991), our data is expressed in ratios to GDP, which enables us to take into 
account the growing nature of the economy. We will present the results for both the 1903-2003 
period and for the 1975-2003 subperiod. The reason for this is to analyse the impact of the 25 
April revolution of 1974 on the sustainability of fiscal policy. The 1975-2003 period comprises 
the largest budget imbalances of our sample, and so it would naturally be interesting to find out 
whether 1975 marks a switch into an unsustainable path or is just one step further along the 
previous (sustainable or unsustainable) path.  
 
According to theoretical results fiscal sustainability requires the stationarity of the budget 
balance, a difference-stationary debt, or the existence of a cointegration relationship between 
revenues and expenditure. These tests are conceptually equivalent. We will start the 
presentation of the empirical evidence by showing the results of the unit root tests for the fiscal 
variables. Afterwards we will present the outcome of the cointegration tests. Finally, we will 
check the robustness of our conclusions to the consideration of structural breaks in the data. 
                                                      
13 See section V for a detailed analysis of the 1890-1893 debt crisis.   13
A. Unit root tests 
In order to reach more robust conclusions we have given the results of three unit root tests: 
the usual Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), the Phillips and Perron (1988) test, and the KPSS test 
developed by Kwiatowski, Phillips et al. (1992).  For the first two tests the null is non-
stationarity, while for the KPSS the null is stationarity.14 The ADF and PP tests are two variants 
of the original Dickey-Fuller test; they differ in their treatment of serially correlated residuals. 
ADF adds lags of the dependent variable (the first difference of the variable that is being tested 
for a unit root) to control for serial correlation, while the PP test applies a nonparametric 
correction to the test statistic. In fact, the PP correction allows for more general dependence in 
the residual process, including conditional heteroskedasticity.  
 
Since the graphical analysis indicates that our variables have been growing over time, for the 
variables in levels we tested for the unit root hypothesis, considering two alternatives for the 
determinist component: just a drift; and a trend (with a constant). If the unit root hypothesis is 
rejected under the latter specification, the variables are trend stationary, i.e. they follow a 
deterministic trend and not a stochastic one. The exception is the deficit variables for which we 
did not allow the presence of any deterministic time trend. Table 2 shows the results obtained. 
Debt, public outlays and public revenues are found to be I(1). According to both the ADF and 
the PP test, the primary deficit is stationary.15 However, the overall “headline” actual inclusive-
of-interest deficit is found to be I(1). A possible explanation is as follows. This unadjusted deficit 
measure equals the primary deficit plus nominal interest rate times lagged debt (all of them 
divided by GDP). If the interest rate is low, the linear combination is dominated by the I(0) 
component and the tests reject a unit root; if the interest rate is high enough, the I(1) component 
might have enough weight to reject I(0) for the linear combination. For our 1903-2003 sample the 
average implicit interest rate on the debt is 5.3%, with a maximum of 15.8% in 1981 (see Table 1). 
However, the actual deficit series is not the appropriate measure for sustainability tests. The 
proper measure is what we call “adjusted” deficit, computed as in (5) by: 
 
  tt t t 1 t t t def s r b , with r (1 i ) (1 ) 1 γ − =+ =+ + −  (11) 
 
The adjusted deficit corresponds to the sum of the primary deficit (st) with growth adjusted 
interest outlays.16 Only by using this properly adjusted rt as the interest rate on the debt is the 
                                                      
14 As a result the KPSS test reverses the usual burden of proof. The main motivation for such a reversion of 
the null is that the traditional unit root tests have little power against stationary alternatives with high 
persistence. For instance, the Dickey and Fuller test is typically unable to distinguish between series with 
a  u n i t  r o o t  a n d  s t a t i o n a r y  A R ( 1 )  s e r i e s  w i t h  a n  a u tocorrelation coefficient near unity (near unit root 
processes). 
15 Only the KPSS test differs in its conclusion, rejecting the null of stationarity.  
16 The nominal implicit interest rate on the debt it is calculated as the ratio between interest outlays in 
period t and the stock of debt in period t-1.   14
identity (1) relating debt and deficit maintained for GDP ratios.17 When using this, appropriate, 
deficit measure, we reach a very different conclusion from the previous one based on the 
headline deficit ratio. The adjusted deficit measure is clearly stationary. As the stationarity of the 
overall deficit a sufficient condition for sustainability, this means that Portuguese fiscal policy 
was sustainable over the 1903-2003 period.18 
 
Table 2- Unit root tests for fiscal variables – ratios to GDP- 1903-2003 
  Tests with trend    Constant, no trend 
Variable  k ADF(k)  PP(4)  KPSS(4)   k  ADF(k)  PP(4)  KPSS(4) 
Debt 0  -1.04  -0.70  0.68***  0  -1.34  -1.0  0.51** 
∆Debt 
 
- -  -  -  0  -10.81***  -11.12***  0.51** 
Primary deficit  - -  -  -  0  -2.95**  -3.15**  0.24 
Actual deficit  -  -  -  -  0  -2.16  -2.29  0.73** 
Adjusted deficit  
(st+rt.Bt-1) 
 
- -  -  -  0  -4.75***  -4.71***  0.42* 
Expenditure 0  -1.75  -1.71  2.01***  0  -0.35  -1.71  1.77*** 
Adjusted expenditure  0 -0.82  -0.48  0.50**  0 -1.4  -1.32  0.72** 
Revenues 0  -2.02  -1.95  2.15***  0  -0.34  -0.27  1.80*** 
Notes: * denotes rejection of the null of a unit root at 10%; ** at 5% and *** at 1%. The null of the ADF test is non-
stationarity, and the null of the KPSS test is stationarity. The optimal lag length for the ADF regression was chosen by 
adding lags until a Lagrange Multiplier test fails to reject the null of no first order residual serial correlation at the 5% 
level, using the uradf.src procedure in Winrats 5.11. The tests with trend also include a constant.  
 
 
Table 3- Unit root tests for fiscal variables – ratios to GDP- 1975-2003 
  Tests with trend    Constant, no trend 
Variable  k ADF(k)  PP(4)  KPSS(4)   k  ADF(k)  PP(4)  KPSS(4) 
Debt 0  -1.74  -1.60  0.57**  0  -2.5  -2.29  0.55** 
∆Debt 
 
- -  -  -  0  -5.1***  -4.99***  0.35 
Primary deficit  - -  -  -  0  -1.42  -1.52 0.45* 
Actual deficit  -  -  -  -  0  -2.15  -1.69  0.49* 
Adjusted deficit  
(st+rt.Bt-1) 
 
- -  -  -  0  -2.21  -2.26 0.21 
Expenditure 0  -2.86  -2.66  1.66***  0  -4.0***a)  -4.11***  0.57** 
Adjusted expenditure  0 -2.23  -2.21  0.24***  0 -1.0  -0.85  0.60** 
Revenues 0  -0.95  -0.75  0.64***  0  -1.76  -2.14  0.61 
Notes: see Table 2. The tests with trend include also a constant. a) The ADF z-test leads to a different conclusion (non-
rejection of the null of non-stationarity). 
 
                                                      
17 When using GDP ratios, the (nominal) economic growth has a direct influence on the evolution of the 
debt ratio. If growth is not zero, the change in debt ratio does not necessarily equal the deficit ratio: if i<g 
the change in the former is less than the change in the latter. 
18 We would derive exactly the same conclusion from the use of real values instead of GDP ratios.    15
Table 3 repeats the same test for the recent 1975-2003 subperiod. Now debt, and all the fiscal 
variables appear to be I(1). Contrary to the previous results, all deficit measures (including the 
primary deficit) are now non-stationary. This means that the 1975-2003 period, marks a shift into an 
unsustainable fiscal policy in Portugal.  
 
In order to cross check our results, and since the expenditure and public revenues were 
found to be I(1), we proceed to the cointegration test between total revenues and total 
expenditure.19 
 
B. Cointegration tests 
To test for cointegration we use both the Johansen (1988) maximum likelihood test and the 
Engle-Granger test.  When there is at most one co-integrating vector, i.e. when we considerer 
just two variables, the two-step method of Engle and Granger (1987) provides a simple testing 
procedure for the existence of cointegration. The first step consists of estimating the proposed 
relationship in levels by OLS. If there is cointegration and the variables are integrated of order 
one, then the residual of estimating them in levels should be stationary. Consequently, it is 
possible to apply the ADF test to the residuals of the long-run regression, using the appropriate 
critical values. 20 
 
Table 4 summarizes the results. In order to enhance comparison with other studies that 
include the Portuguese economy, 21 we report the tests using the (incorrect) total expenditure 
measure and the (correct) ggt defined in equation (10) as the sum of primary expenditure with 
the growth-adjusted interest payments on the debt. 
 
                                                      
19 Although the unit root and the cointegration tests are conceptually equivalent, in practice different 
conclusions might arise. This is because an exact equivalence requires a constant interest rate on the debt, 
and that all variables are measured consistently. In finite data samples, especially in short ones, the low 
power of the unit root and cointegration tests might also lead, by itself, to different conclusions.  
20 If we found two co-integrating vectors between just two variables, the variables would be individually 
stationary, contradicting the assumption that they are both I(1). 
21 See for instance Bravo and Silvestre (2002).   16
Table 4- Tests for cointegration between revenues and expenditure (%GDP) 
  Johansen maximum likelihood test    Engle-Granger 
 Trace    λ max   
Eigenvalue  H0 H 1  Trace    H0 H 1  λ max 
β  β=1 
 
ADF  β 
Using actual expenditure 
1903-2003                   
 0.119167  r = 0  r > 0   12.85  r = 0  r = 1   12.82  -  -   -2.693 0.753 
 0.000366  r ≤ 1  r > 1   0.04  r = 1  r = 2   0.04       (30.7) 
1975-2003                    
 0.478347  r = 0  r > 0   24.11**  r = 0  r = 1   18.87**  2.39 11.7***    -2.601 1.29 
 0.165299  r ≤ 1  r > 1   5.24*  r = 1  r = 2   5.24*  (7.2) (0.0)     (10.7) 
Using adjusted ggt expenditure 
1903-2003                  
 0.153008  r = 0  r > 0  16.79**  r = 0  r = 1  16.77**  0.869 2.04   -4.43***  0.711 
 0.000210  r ≤ 1  r > 1  0.02  r = 1  r = 2  0.02  (10.5) (0.15)    20.0 
1975-2003                   
 0.266533  r = 0  r > 0  11.99  r = 0  r = 1  8.99  - -    -2.316 0.898 
 0.098415  r ≤ 1  r > 1  3.0  r = 1  r = 2  3.0        (6.9) 
Notes: * denotes rejection of the null of a unit root at 10%; ** at 5% and *** at 1%. In parenthesis, T-values for 
coefficients, and LR test p-values for β=1. The Johansen test results are based on a lag length of three for the VAR in 
levels (p=3), i.e. using lags 1 2 in EViews 4.0. The lag length was chosen using the Akaike information criteria for 
the 1903-2003 period. Critical values for the trace and maximum likelihood tests are from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). 
The estimations were obtained assuming a linear trend in the levels of the data, and only an intercept in the 
cointegration equations. The critical values for the Engle-Granger cointegration test are from MacKinnon (1991), 
which have the advantage of being given for any sample size. The ADF test is done without any deterministic 
component, since the equation in levels already includes a constant (omitted from the results). 
 
For the 1903-2003 period the results are in line with those given by the unit root tests. When 
using the inappropriate headline expenditure measure the null of no cointegration is not 
rejected by the data. On the other hand, when using the appropriate ggt measure, the null of no 
cointegration is clearly rejected by both the Engle-Granger and the Johansen test. Moreover, the 
null that β equals unity is not rejected by the LR test. This indicates that Portuguese fiscal policy 
has been sustainable over the 1903-2003 period. This conclusion is robust to adjusting the 
revenues for seignorage.22  
 
For the recent 1975-2003 period, the Engle-Granger test concludes for the absence of 
cointegration, irrespective of the expenditure measures used. In contrast, the Johansen’s test 
reaches an odd result for the actual unadjusted expenditure: it finds two cointegrating vectors 
and an implausibly high β estimate.23 T h i s  c o u l d  b e  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  l o w  p o w e r  d u e  t o  f e w  
                                                      
22 Seignorage revenue was proxied by the (current prices) change in the monetary basis (as a percentage of 
GDP). Average seignorage gains are 1.1% of GDP, but their distribution over time is not uniform, with the 
average being dominated by a few large values (the standard deviation is 1.7%). 
23 The finding of a cointegration ranking of two, with just two variables in the VAR, is only compatible 
with the variables being stationary, which is apparently not the case here.   17
observations, or to the inadequacy of the headline unadjusted expenditure ratio for the 
sustainability tests. Using the proper ggt measure, the Johansen test is unable to reject the null of 
no cointegration at conventional significance levels. As a result, we can safely conclude for the 
absence of cointegration between revenues and expenditure in the more recent period, meaning 
that Portuguese fiscal policy appears to have been unsustainable since 1975. This result is in line 
with the conclusions we derived from the unit root tests. 
 
C. Extension: Cointegration tests allowing for regime shifts 
A natural extension of this work is to formally test for the presence of structural breaks in 
the data. One relevant test has been proposed by Gregory and Hansen (1996) and it could be 
applied to the Engle-Granger two-step procedure. The authors develop a methodology that 
enables a residual-based testing of the null of no cointegration against the alternative of 
cointegration in the presence of a possible regime shift, with the break occurring at an unknown 
point in time. It is then possible to compute modified ADF statistics (ADF*) allowing for a 
regime change in the intercept or in the coefficient vector. The independence of this test with 
regard to the breaking date invalidates data mining from contaminating the choice of the break 
point. This test is interesting because the power of the usual ADF test decreases sharply in the 
presence of a structural break. If the model is in fact cointegrated, a standard ADF test may not 
reject the null, leading to the wrong conclusion that there is no long-run relationship. 
 
The standard cointegration model could be written as follows: 
  1t 1 2t t yy e µ α = ++  (12) 
 
where y1r and y2t are I(1) and et is I(0). A structural change would shift the long-run co-
-integration relationship to a new level, reflecting changes in the intercept µ and/or in the slope 
α. Hence, the  Gregory and Hansen (1996) test allows a regime shift in either the intercept alone 
or in the entire coefficient vector. More specifically, the authors propose testing the following 
hypotheses to account for three types of possible structural breaks: 
 
1. Level Shift (C):  
  1t 1 2 1 2t t yD y e τ µ µα = ++ +  (13) 
  
2. Level shift with trend (C/T): 
  1t 1 2 1 2t t yD t y e τ µ µβ α =+ ++ +  (14) 
 
3. Regime shift (C/S): 
 
  1t 1 2 1 1 2t 2 2t 1 t yD y y D e ττ µ µα α =+ + + +  (15) 
 
where D1τ = 0 for t ≤ [τT], D1τ = 1 for t > [τT], T is the number of observations, and τ ∈ (0, 1) the 
unknown parameter that denotes the relative timing of the change point, and [ ] denotes the 
integer part. The first model allows a change in the intercept at the time of the shift. The second   18
model allows the slope of the vector to shift too. The third possibility is to allow the equilibrium 
relationship to rotate as well as shift parallel.  
 
A cointegration test statistic is calculated for every possible regime shift, retaining the smallest 
value of the statistics (the largest negative value), across all values of τ. The smallest value is 
retained because a small value for the statistic constitutes evidence against the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration.24 In practice the models are recursively estimated by OLS for all possible break 
points in the trimming interval τ ∈ (0.15, 0.85), and the ADF* statistic is computed as: 
 
(0.15,0.85)






Another useful regime change test is proposed by Hansen (2003). This test is applied to the 
Johansen method. However, contrary to the previous test, it takes the timing of the change and 
the number of cointegration relations at any point in time as given, which requires the 
imposition of a priori information or some resort to the data. We will therefore not use it in our 
empirical application. 
 
As shown in Table 5, for the 1903-2003 period, the Gregory-Hansen ADF* cointegration test 
rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration for all the three possible structural break models 
(with the exception of the first model for unadjusted data). The rejection of the null hypothesis is 
clear when using the adjusted expenditure series. The possible breaks in the data appear to 
occur in 1917 (i.e. at the beginning of the budgetary crisis caused by the First World War), or in 
1983-84 (when the deficit ratio reached historical maximums).  
 
Some researchers might argue that our full sample is too long a period just to consider one 
possible break in the data, and so we repeated the same Gregory-Hansen test for post-war data 
only. Now the possible break in the data occurs for all considered models after the revolution of 
1974. Once again the null of no cointegration is clearly rejected for all considered structural 
break models (with the exception of the first for actual non-adjusted data).  
 
These results mean that, allowing the cointegration relationships to change over time, there 
appears to be some sort of a long-run cointegration relationship between Portuguese public 
revenues and Portuguese public receipts. Hence, it seems that Portuguese public finances are 
s u s t a i n a b l e  o v e r  t h e  l o n g  r u n .  O u r  p r e v i o u s  c o n c l u s i o n s  t h u s  a p p e a r  t o  b e  r o b u s t  t o  t h e  
consideration of structural breaks in the data. 
 
 
                                                      
24 With regard to the existence of a structural break, if the standard ADF statistic does not reject, but the 
ADF* does, this implies that structural change in the cointegrating vector may be important. However, as 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) note, if both the ADF and the ADF* reject, no inference that structural change 
has occurred can be drawn from this piece of information alone, since the ADF* statistics is are powerful 
against conventional cointegration.   19
Table 5- Gregory-Hansen ADF* test for cointegration between public revenues and 
expenditure in the presence of an unknown structural break (1903-2003) 
  Level Shift    Level shift with trend    Regime shift 
  Year  Test Stat.    Year  Test Stat.    Year  Test Stat. 
1903-2003 
Actual  expend.  1973  -4.14   1987  -4.93**   1917  -5.53*** 
Adj. expend. (ggt) 1917  -5.55***   1984  -6.08***   1983  -5.64*** 
                
1947-2003 
Actual  expend.  1973  -4.14   1987  -4.93**   1987  -4.72* 
Adj. expend. (ggt) 1992  -5.24***   1984  -6.08***   1986  -5.51*** 
Notes: *, **, and *** denotes the rejection of the null of no cointegration at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. The critical values are from Gregory and Hansen (1996: 109), m = 1. The lags selected 
for the ADF* for the C, C/T, and C/S are (0, 0, 0). The optimal lag length for the ADF regression was 
chosen by adding lags until a Lagrange Multiplier test fails to reject the null of no first order 
residual serial correlation at 5% level, considering a maximum of 2 lags. The “usual” ADF test 
statistics, without allowing for any structural break, are -2.16 and -4.75** for the unadjusted 
headline deficit and for the adjusted deficit (st+rttbt-1), respectively (see Table 2). The results were 
obtained in Winrats using an own programme. 
 
 
V. The 1890-1893 debt crisis: direct evidence against 
sustainability? 
 
In this section we look at the issues related to the external debt crisis of 1890-1893 in more 
detail. The purpose is to see whether this crisis is direct evidence against the sustainability of 
Portuguese public finances in the second half of the 19th century. 
 
A. The causes of the crisis 
In order to better understand this period, and the statistical data presented earlier, it is 
important to look at how was Portuguese public debt issued at the time. Following the external 
debt conversion of 1852, the Portuguese government wanted to issue debt consolidated 
(perpetual) debt at the same nominal interest rate of 3% as Great Britain and France. However, 
external investors were only willing to acquire it at a considerable discount on par value, in 
order to have an effective rate greater than 3%. Since at the time most debt was perpetual this 
did not represent any inefficiency for the state: it is the same to issue a perpetual bond at par 
value with a 6% interest rate, or to issue it 50% below par value and to pay 3% interest.25 Both 
possibilities imply the same interest payments over time. With regard to the placement markets , 
London was the dominant market until 1870s, when it was supplanted by Paris (Berlin joined, 
too, in 1886). 
                                                      
25 As long as the government does not buy it back in the market. The same is not true for amortizable debt.   20
 
The 1890-1893 crisis was largely the result of debt accumulation, caused by persistent past 
budget deficits, and was detonated by the coincidence of several events. As mentioned above, 
the Regeneration period was dominated by the idea of “material improvements”.26 Those 
consisted of large public investment in infrastructure (in transport and communications), 
financed in large part by public borrowing, especially by external loans. These investments were 
meant to foster economic growth, repaying themselves (with interest) in increased tax revenues. 
Given the small weight of the government in the economy, and Portugal’s record of three 
foreign debt reschedulings, this was a very risky project which, in order to succeed, would have 
required substantial increases in public revenues.27 However, as Esteves (2004a: 115) points out 
at the time Portugal’s tax structure was archaic: on average 13% of the revenues were raised by 
indirect taxes on tobacco, and 39% came from import duties. As a result, the commercial crises 
of 1867-69, 1876, and 1889-90 had a direct negative impact on public accounts. The response to 
these crises was an increase in direct taxation, which was proportional. But these increases in 
taxation were achieved by imposing supplements, without reforming the tax code. Nor was 
there any progress towards reducing tax evasion. Moreover, as economic growth did not 
substantially accelerate in this period, public revenues failed to increase as hoped. Since current 
expenditure was not curtailed, it was impossible to transform the budget deficit into the surplus 
required to redeem the debt. 
 
Figure V-1- Interest outlay (% Revenue), Budget Cover rate (Rev/Exp) and the External debt ratio 
(%GDP) – 1852-1910 
Interest (% Rev) Budget cover rat Ext debt ratio

















                                                      
26 This term was borrowed from the French “améliorations matérielles”. 
27 In the aftermath of the civil war there were frequent delays in the payment of interest, usually added to 
the principal, and three debt reschedulings - in 1840, 1845, and 1852. Before the 1852 conversion the debt 
service was unsustainable since it absorbed almost 2/3 of the tax revenues. The loans from the civil war 
period were subject to 9% interest.   21
Despite this latent non-sustainability, by today’s Maastricht criteria, there were no 
immediate negative fiscal developments around 1890 that could potentially trigger a debt 
crisis.28 As shown in the previous graphs, in the 1880’s the debt ratio remained relatively stable 
i n  t h e  6 0 - 7 0 %  r a n g e ,  t h e  b u d g e t  d e f i c i t  w a s  a r o u n d  1 %  o f  G D P ,  a n d  t h e  c o v e r  r a t e  o f  
expenditure by revenues remained fairly constant around 75%. There was even very positive 
progress in the interest outlay burden over the decade.29 However, we should bear in mind that 
the weight of the government in the economy was very low, and that the external debt was 
equivalent to eight years of public revenues. Thus any obstacle to the rollover of the debt could 
trigger a crisis. In fact, the crisis was sparked off by the conjunction of several political, financial 
and economic factors: 
- In 1889 there was a crisis in Brazil’s coffee exports, which led to a substantial 
reduction in the gold remittances to Portugal from Portuguese emigrants in Brazil (these 
remittances fell by 82% between 1888 and 1891, from 4355 contos t o  j u s t  8 0 0 ,  i . e .  f r o m  
£965,846 to £165,563).30  
- On 11 January 1890 England issued an ultimatum to Portugal to withdraw from some 
of its possessions in Africa, and sent seven warships to Lisbon to enforce it. The government 
conceded, which caused great popular outrage and a Republican rebellion on 31-1-1891, in 
Porto. 
- In April 1890, the crisis was detonated by the inability of the government to place a 
new loan in Paris. It was the first time this happened in 38 years, and was mainly the result 
of a boycott campaign led by the holders of the D. Miguel loan.31 Together with the fall in 
gold remittances, this brought about a lack of liquidity (gold) to service the debt. To make 
things worse, in the follow-up to Argentina’s debt crisis, in November 1890, the firm Baring 
Brothers, which was Portugal’s London agent for floating the short term debt, became 
insolvent and suspended the payments. The Portuguese government could neither float 
further debt in external markets, nor pay the interest on the outstanding debt.   
- With regard to the monetary system, Portugal was in the gold standard. In September 
1890 there was a run on the Montepio Geral bank, and several banks in Porto were on the 
verge of bankruptcy. The Bank of Portugal went to the rescue. Due to the large sums 
involved, the government granted legal tender status to the notes of Bank of Portugal, 
abandoning the gold standard in May 1891.32  
                                                      
28 See also the econometric analysis below, in section V.C. 
29 Interest outlay fell from 76% to 47% of the total effective revenues in the 1880s.   
30 Data on Portuguese currency from Esteves (2004a). The conto was a unit of account worth one million 
réis. The par exchange rate was 4500 réis per pound sterling. Later, with the Republic, the Portuguese 
currency became the escudo (PTE), worth 1000 réis (a conto being one thousand escudos). Fom 1999, the 
escudo has been replaced by the euro, worth 200.482 PTE (a conto is equivalent to 4.988 euros). 
31 This was a loan raised by the absolutist government in 1832 (during the civil war, which they lost) and 
which the liberal government repudiated. The bondholders wanted reimbursement of the loan with 
interest. 
32 As Esteves (2003) puts it, the abandoning of the gold standard helped to ease the transition to sounder 
public finances, because in the years immediately after 1891 the bulk of the deficit was financed by the 
Bank of Portugal.   22
- In 1891 the Portuguese government only managed to issue a new loan in Paris by 
consigning for 35 years the revenues from the tobacco monopoly. Most of the amount thus 
obtained, however, was simply to pay in the interest due up to the end of 1891. 
 
With this gloomy scenario, negotiation with c r e d i t o r s  t o  r e s c h e d u l e  t h e  d e b t  b e c a m e  
inevitable. But no agreement was reached. On 13-6-1892, by decree, Portugal unilaterally cut the 
interest on external debt to 1/3 of its contractual value (to 1%). Alternatively, creditors could opt 
to convert their securities into internal debt. This partial default caused a long dispute with 
foreign creditors. In May 1893 a law was passed giving additional compensation to bondholders 
by sharing some of the import duties between the Portuguese state and the external creditors. 
Finally, in 1902 a convention was signed. The settlement comprised a debt reduction of 38% (the 
outstanding capital was reduced from £56,198,000 to £34,734,000), and a reduction in the annual 
debt service from £1,894,000 in 1892 to £947,000 to be paid over 99 years (3% interest).  
 
B. Was the crisis anticipated by the market? 
It appears that despite the systematic primary surpluses, Portugal was rolling over its debt 
from 1853-1890: in only forty years the debt ratio doubled from 32% of GDP (in 1851) to 71% (in 
1891).33 A relevant question is that of knowing whether the market has anticipated the crisis. 
Following Esteves (2003), we will use the secondary market’s price of Portuguese external debt 
as an indirect indicator of the market’s awareness of the likelihood of a default. As Figure V-2 
and Table 6 show, there is no evidence that the market anticipated the crisis. The price of the 3% 
consolidated loan reached an historical maximum in the eve of the crisis. A computation of the 
yield premium of Portuguese bonds over British and French bonds reaches the same conclusion: 
the interest premium decreases in the 1880s to reach an historical low of 1.7% versus the British 
Consols (1% versus the French Rentes) in 1889. Hence, it appears that the market has not 
anticipated the political and economic problems that led to the 1890 debt crisis.34  
 
                                                      
33 Over 1853-1891, the average nominal implicit interest rate on the debt was 4.1%, which was higher than 
the 2.7% average nominal GDP growth. 
34 Possible explanations for this willingness to hold Portuguese debt, despite the previous three 
reschedulings, are, according to Esteves (2003) the relative abundance of capital in Europe at the time,  
and the inability to predict both the Brazilian remittance crisis and the boycott of Portuguese debt in Paris.   23






























































Data sources: see Table 6. 
 
With regard to foreign press, it was only in 1880 that The Economist journal mentioned that 
the return from the public investments was not yet anything like sufficient to meet the interest 
charges, and that the European money markets were getting tired “and that with reason, of the 
constant application by Portugal for fresh loans”. In 1885 the editorial is so negative that it 
concludes that “In the interest of Portugal herself it would be well if her facilities for borrowing 
were now curtailed”.35 Nevertheless, Portugal continued to have access to new loans, mainly in 
the financial markets of Paris and Berlin. It thus seems that the market as whole has disregarded 
the opinion of the Economist. 
 
Table 6- Average yield and premium on external debt 
Yield  1853-59 1860-69 1870-79 1880-89 1890-91  1892-1902  1903-1910
Portuguese  6.9 6.9 6.9 5.6 5.8 4.1 4.8 
British  Consols  3.2 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.9 
French Rentes  4.3 4.4 4.7 3.7 3.2 3.0 3.1 
Premium of Portuguese bond yield over: 
British  Consols  3.7 3.6 3.7 2.6 3.1 1.6 1.9 
French Rentes  2.6 2.5 2.2 1.9 2.5 1.1 1.7 
Notes: The risk premium of the Portuguese external debt is calculated as the difference between the yield on 
the Portuguese perpetual debt and the yield on the British consols or on French Rentes. 
Source of data: for Portuguese data, a price series kindly provided by Rui Esteves complemented with data 
from Valério (1986); for British and French long term government bond yields, Homer (1977). The Portuguese 
data is based from 1853 until 1891 on the consolidated loan with a 3% interest rate; from 1892 until 1902 on the 
same loan with the interest rate decreased by decree to 1%; and from 1903 to 1910 on the 3% loan created by 
the conversion law of 1902 (with a maturity of 99 years and a constant debt service). 
 
In the period after the end of the crisis in 1902, Portugal was not penalised in terms of 
aggravated interest premium, for her partial default: the average premium even fell to levels 
                                                      
35 The quotations come from the editions of 27.11.1880, page 1390 and 3.1.1885, page 5, respectively. The 
references and quotations come from Esteves (2004b). See this author, too, for further details.   24
c o n s i d e r a b l y  b e l o w  t h o s e  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  d e c a d e s .  T h e  p e n a l t y  c a m e  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  n o  
immediate access to further external loans. 
 
C. Was fiscal policy unsustainable in the 1852-1890 period? 
We will now apply the formal tests for sustainability derived in section II for the pre-debt 
crisis period. As we said earlier, the tests consist of both unit root and cointegration tests. 
However, as the time dimension is relatively short, and these tests require large samples to be 
valid, our results should be read with some caution.  
 
As before, Table 7 presents the unit root tests for the fiscal variables. We will present the 
results of the ADF, PP, and KPSS tests for unit roots. The results suggest the non-stationarity of 
the debt ratio in this period, but both the actual expenditure and the revenues ratios are found to 
be trend-stationary. The exception is the adjusted expenditure measure (ggt), which is found to 
be I(1).36 With regard to the deficit measures, both the primary deficit and the inclusive-of-
interest deficit are found to be stationary. This would suggest that fiscal policy was sustainable 
in the period leading up to the 1890 debt crisis. However, as we are including a constant in the 
unit root test, it could also be the case that the deficit has been stationary around a too high 
(constant) level to ensure sufficiently quick debt reduction.  
 
 
Table 7- Unit root tests for fiscal variables – ratios to GDP- 1852-1890 
Tests with trend    Constant, no trend 
Variable 
k ADF(k)  PP(4)  KPSS(4)   k  ADF(k)  PP(4)  KPSS(4) 
Debt 0  -1.46  -1.49  0.83***  0  -1.06  -1.05  0.82*** 
∆Debt  
 
-  - - - 0  -7.73***  -7.63***  0.18 
Primary deficit  -  - - - 0  -3.24**  -3.27**  0.49** a) 
Actual  deficit  -  - - - 1  -2.98**  -5.31***  0.19 
Adjusted deficit  
(st+rt.Bt-1) 
 
-  - - - 0  -5.22***  -5.25***  0.08 
Expenditure 1  -6.32***  -6.32***  3.37***  1  -1.88  -4.25***  0.72**a) 
Adjusted expenditure (ggt)  1 0.13  -1.45  1.14***  0  -1.28  -1.17  0.70** 
Revenues 0  -3.90**  -3.86**  3.38***  2  0.50  -0.69  0.79***a) 
Notes: * denotes rejection of the null of a unit root at 10%; ** at 5% and *** at 1%. The null of the ADF test is non-
stationarity, and the null of the KPSS test is stationarity. The optimal lag length for the ADF regression was chosen by 
adding lags until a Lagrange Multiplier test fails to reject the null of no first order residual serial correlation at 5% 
level, using the uradf.src procedure in Winrats 5.11. The tests with trend include also a constant. a) the null of 
stationarity is not rejected at 5% if l=12. 
 
If revenues are indeed a stationary process, there is no justification for cointegration tests 
between the revenues and inclusive-of-interest expenditure. However, since the unit root tests 
                                                      
36 This variable corresponds to the sum of primary expenditure with interest outlay adjusted for growth. 
This is the appropriate measure to use in the cointegration tests.   25
have low power, and in this case are based on only 40 years of data, we decided to report the 
cointegration tests as well to cross check our conclusions. As in section IV.B, we will use the 
two-step method of Engle and Granger (1987) and the Johansen (1988)’s maximum likelihood 
estimation procedure to test for cointegration. 
 
Table 8- Tests for cointegration between revenues and expenditure (%GDP) –1852-1890  
  Johansen maximum likelihood test    Engle-Granger 
 Trace    λ max   
Eigenvalue  H0 H 1  Trace    H0 H 1  λ max 
β  β=1 
 
ADF  β 
Using actual expenditure 
 0.268178  r = 0  r > 0   11.69  r = 0  r = 1   11.24  - -    -2.706 0.315 
 0.012537  r ≤ 1  r > 1   0.45  r = 1  r = 2   0.45        (3.99) 
Using adjusted  ggt expenditure 
 0.364541  r = 0  r > 0   16.36**  r = 0  r = 1   16.32**  1.19   0.06    -1.217 0.058 
 0.000987  r ≤ 1  r > 1   0.04  r = 1  r = 2   0.04  (4.1)   (0.80)      (1.53) 
Notes: * denotes rejection of the null of a unit root at 10%; ** at 5% and *** at 1%. In parenthesis, T-values for 
coefficients, and LR test p-values for β=1. The Johansen test results are based on a lag length of three (p=3) for the 
VAR in levels (p=3), i.e. using lags 1 2 in EViews 4.0. Critical values for the trace and maximum likelihood tests are 
from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). The estimations were obtained assuming a linear trend in the levels of the data, and 
only an intercept in the cointegration equations. The critical values for the Engle-Granger cointegration test are 
from MacKinnon (1991), and they have the advantage of being given for any sample size. The ADF test is done 
without any deterministic component, since the equation in levels already includes a constant (omitted in the 
results). 
 
The cointegration test results are given in Table 8. We should keep in mind that the correct 
measure of expenditure to use in the cointegration test is the ggt measure, and not the actual 
total government expenditure ratio.  In clear contrast with the unit root results, the Engle-
Granger test is unable to reject the null of no cointegration for both specifications. Moreover, the 
estimated  β coefficient is very low.37 Only the Johansen test using the ggt variable yields a 
different result, but in this case the estimated β coefficient of 1.19 is implausibly high, especially 
when compared with the Engle-Granger estimate of 0.058 for the same variables.38 We think, 
therefore, that the estimated vector should not be retained as a cointegrating vector. 
 
To sum up, the conclusions regarding sustainability are not clear cut for the 1852-1890 
period. The contradicting results could be due to data quality problems, to the short time 
dimension, or to the inadequacy of this partial analysis methodology for assessing debt 
sustainability in these particular circumstances.39 See Bohn (2004) for an interesting critique of 
                                                      
37 The Engle-Granger β coefficient is exactly the same coefficient that might be obtained in an OLS 
regression between stationary variables. 
38 If we reduce the number of lags in the VAR, only the trace test rejects the null of no cointegration at the 
5% level. 
39 This partial equilibrium analysis ignores the interaction between the budget and the economy, the size 
of the government, its ability to collect taxes, and the composition of the debt. In this period much of the 
debt was external debt, the debt service was extremely burdensome on the modest public revenues, and   26
the overall methodology. Using a completely different methodology, based on generational 
accounting calculations, Esteves (2003) concludes that Portuguese finances were running on an 
unsustainable path. Moreover, the actual 1892 partial default on the external debt signals a de 
facto u n s u s t a i n a b l e  d e b t  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d .  T h e  P o rtuguese economy was unable to generate a 
sufficient amount of external revenues to service the debt. 
 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
This paper tests for the sustainability of Portuguese fiscal policy over a long period of data. 
We find considerable evidence in favour of sustainability for the 1903-2003 period. The use of 
such a long dataset is appropriate because both unit root and cointegration tests require a long 
period of data. Our analysis is based on the use of ratios to GDP, which are suitable for a 
growing economy. Previous results pointing to overall non-sustainability of Portuguese fiscal 
policy might be due to a short time dimension and to the use of an improper deficit or 
expenditure measures, not adjusted for growth.40  
 
The overall conclusion of sustainability for the 1903-2003 period is not maintained for the 
more recent 1975-2003 period, which is characterised by the largest deficit to GDP ratios of our 
sample. This period appears to signal a shift to an unsustainable path in Portuguese fiscal 
policy. Hence, our results suggest that it is in fact necessary to continue to pursue fiscal 
consolidation efforts in Portugal.  
 
The conclusion of sustainability for the 1903 to 2003 period seems to be robust to the 
consideration of structural breaks in the data. Since we found a stationary primary deficit for the 
1903-2003 period, it would be also worthwhile to cross-check the conclusions of the unit root 
and cointegration sustainability tests with the method proposed by Bohn (1998). This method 
tries to find out, using adequate controls, whether the primary surplus responds to changes in 
the debt to GDP ratio. As that would imply a major expansion of this paper, however, it remains 
an interesting programme for future research.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
there were many exogenous events to fiscal policy in the detonation of the crisis. This is simply not 
captured by the presented tests. 
40 See Bravo and Silvestre (2002) and Afonso (2000). These authors used the actual total inclusive-of-
interest expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) in their cointegration tests, without correcting the interest 
payments for growth. As a result their measures are not consistent with the deficit-debt identity, leading 
to its clear violation.    27
Statistical appendix 
In Portugal, the relevant economic years for fiscal data have not always coincided with 
calendar years. The economic years from 1834-1835 to 1933-1934 began on 1 July of each civil 
year and ended on 30 June of the following civil year. The economic years from 1936 on 
coincided with the civil years. For the purposes of transition, the economic year of 1934-1935 
began on 1 January 1934 and ended on 31 December 1935, under the terms of the same decree-
law. As GDP data is only available on a calendar basis, there is inevitably a timing problem in 
defining fiscal variables as GDP ratios until 1936. Because fiscal decisions were taken on an 
annual basis (expressed in economic years), it makes no economic sense to adjust the economic 
years to calendar years. In order to enable a smooth transition in 1936, we deflate the economic 
year observation t to t+1 with the GDP of period t+1. For example the data on the fiscal year 
1934-1935 is divided by GDP1935 to calculate the fiscal variable ratios of 1935. An alternative 
method would be to calculate, as Mata (1993) did, an average GDP between t and t+1. However, 
this alternative method would entail having a break in 1936.  
 
We also used official data for the whole period, without making any adjustments to it 
(except correcting for the recent one-off measures). As pointed out by Bohn (1991), the official 
data is most informative about government behaviour if policy-makers are primarily influenced 
by the official data. The main source of data is the publication from the Portuguese Institute of 
National Statistics (INE) coordinated by Valério (2001). For the period before 1913 the original 
data was collected by Mata (1993). Since this data is less rounded we have used the original 
source. Detailed series for the period 1913-1947 are available in Valério (1994). All variables were 
converted into euros using the irrevocable conversion rate of 1EUR= 200.482 PTE. The detailed 
source for each variable is given below. 
 
As discussed in the text, our data refers to the central government accounts, expressed on a 
public accounting basis and not on a national accounting basis. This because the main source of 
the historical data is the “Conta Geral do Estado”, which is a yearly publication from the 
Ministry of Finance containing the final information on budget execution, in a public accounting 
perspective. Data on a national accounting basis is only available from 1947 onwards. A 
coherent dataset, compiled by the Bank of Portugal for the period 1947-1995, is published in 
Pinheiro (1999). The main drawback of our dataset is the non-inclusion of the other sub-sectors 
of the public administrations. It is not possible, however, to find historical data for the whole 
sample period. In contrast, as public accounting mostly follows a cash basis registering, it is 




1861-1994: Valério (2001). The source for this variable for the period 1947-1994 corresponds 
to Pinheiro (1999), i.e. the author has linked its historical series with Bank of Portugal’s estimates 
for the 1947-1995 period. This series was adjusted to the level of the next period, which is in the 
ESA95 standard. 
1995-2003: INE estimates, as they appear in Ministério das Finanças (2003).   28
 
Primary expenditure 
The primary expenditure corresponds to the difference between total effective expenditure, 
total effective public expenditure and interest payments on the debt. The source of actual data 
on total effective expenditure was:  
1852-1913: Mata (1993); 1914-1998: Valério (2001) 




Corresponds to total effective public revenues of the Portuguese State (Estado) adjusted for 
the effects of the extraordinary revenues obtained in 2000, 2002 and 2003. Such excluded 
revenues amounted to 399 million EUR in 2000 (UMTS); 1830 millions in 2002 (CREL revenues, 
sale of the fixed telecommunication network to Portugal Telecom and an extraordinary 
regularisation of taxpayers debts); and 1962 millions EUR in 2003 (mainly sale of government 
credits to Citigroup, and integration of the pension fund of the Portuguese post office, CTT, into 
the public servants’ pension system, CGA). The effective revenues exclude the revenues from 
loans. 
1852-1913: Mata (1993); 1914-1998: Valério (2001) 




Corresponds to the difference between total public revenues and total public expenditure. 
 
Public debt 
1861-1913:Mata (1993); 1914-1979: Valério (2001) 
1980-2003: Instituto Gestão do Crédito Público (IGCP), Direct State Debt 
 
Interest payments on the debt 
1861-1913: Mata (1993), Table 11. The author distinguishes total public debt servicing costs, 
which comprises amortization of the debt, interest payments and administrative costs. There are 
observations on the interest missing for the years 1860, 1866, and 1898-1907. We assumed that 
the interest payments in 1860 were an average of its values in 1859 and 1861. Due to lack of data 
on administrative costs, the interest data for 1866 is calculated by difference, assuming that the 
administrative costs remain equal to their average weight in the total, during the last three years 
before 1866 (0.35%). From 1898 to 1913  Mata (1993) is again unable to disaggregate between 
administrative costs and interest payments. We again found the interest payments by 
computing the difference between the total servicing costs, excluding the amortization of the 
debt, and the estimated administrative costs, which were obtained assuming that their weight in 
the total is equal to the average for the 3 years before and the 3 years after the lack of data 
(0.3%).  
1914-1947: Valério (1994), table 22 
1948-2003: collected by us, from the Conta Geral do Estado (yearly publication).    29
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